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OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES, PATTERNS OF CONTROL
AND ENTERPRISE BEHAVIOR IN RUSSIA
J.Earle, S.Estrin and L.Leshchenko
"We have created a broad basis of shareholders who have
an economic interest in the success of the reform" A.
Chubais (FT, 30th June 1994)
"Most enterprises continue to be run unchallenged by old
management teams, which often lack the human capital and
interest to initiate significant restructuring" M. Boycko (FT,
30th June 1994).
1. INTRODUCTION
According to The Financial Times (June 27, 1994), Russia's mass
privatization program, carried out between late 1992 and mid-1994,
"sold more than 11,000 state owned enterprises, accounting for around
70% of Russian industry, in exchange for cash and 148m freely
distributed vouchers."  From a very low level in 1992, employment in
the private sector is estimated to have grown to around 50% of the
labor force (EBRD, cited in IHT).  It is unsurprising therefore that
Russia's pro-reform politicians, as well as some Western analysts (see
eg Leiberman and Nellis (1994)) have hailed the program as a success.
But for many observers the speed of privatization has been bought at
the price of sub-optimal ownership structures, which may carry
deleterious implications for the restructuring process.
Surprisingly, there has been little empirical analysis as yet of
which ownership forms have emerged, nor of the implications for the
control and behavior of formerly state owned firms.  Government
sources suggest that some 40 million people, around half the labor
force, have become shareholders (Reuters, 30 June 1994), and
according to Professor Yasin, head of Yeltsin's advisory economic
2council, "insiders own on average some 70% of the privatized
enterprises" (reported in FT, 30th June 1994).  Data from a sample of
142 firms by Blasi and Shleifer (1995) indicate that insiders held on
average some 65% of the shares in 1993.  The ownership question may
be crucial, for economic theory predicts different performance, not
merely depending on whether firms are privately or state owned, but
according to whether privately owned firms are insider or outsider
controlled, and whether the controlling group of insiders are managers
or workers (see eg Aghion, Blanchard, Burgess (1994)). While all the
evidence suggests that it is employees who hold a majority of shares
(see eg Blasi (1994)), control is usually argued to be vested primarily
in the hands of senior management (see eg Blasi and Shleifer (1995),
Commander, Dhar, Yemtsov (1995)).  However, there has not yet been
an attempt to describe the patterns of ownership and control, nor to
analyze the impact on different areas of enterprise decision-making.  It
is these three issues - ownership structures, patterns of control and
enterprise behavior - and their inter-relationships which are the subject
matter of this paper.
The following two sections set the context for the empirical work.
A framework of analysis is outlined in section 2, which summarizes
hypotheses about how alternative majority ownership forms might
influence control and behavior, and there is a brief discussion of
institutional features of ownership in Russia in the third.  The fourth
section addresses the question of who owns Russian firms, on the basis
of a sectorally as well as geographically representative structured
random sample (see Fan and Fang (1995)).  Enterprises are
categorized, according to largest ownership holdings, into State-Owned
(SO), Worker-Owned (WO), Manager- Owned (MO), Outsider-Owned
(OO), and new (de novo) private firms (DNs); these are the groupings
which form the basis for the subsequent analysis of control and
behavior.  We find that, among all privatized companies, workers hold
48% of shares, managers 21% and outsiders 20%; the remaining shares
are still held by the state.  Workers hold a dominant stake in 65% of
privatized firms; managers in 19% and outsiders in 16%.  Privatized
3firms make up almost 60% of firms in the sample; of the remainder
almost two thirds are still in state hands.
In the fifth section we begin to investigate whether majority
ownership has yet translated itself into control in Russian firms.  The
qualitative evidence suggests that "management and executive boards"
have the greatest influence over all types of enterprise decisions,
irrespective of the structure of shareholdings.  Although  consistent
with widespread popular perception, this result emanates from the
opinion of managers responding to the survey, suggesting further
investigation into enterprise behavior.  This we do in the sixth section,
which inquires whether different majority ownership forms lead to
different economic relationships with the state, and to different
economic performance.  We find striking evidence that the
development of a politically independent and market oriented
enterprise sector is associated with private ownership, most noticeably
in de novo private firms but also in dominant worker owned ones.
There are relatively few ownership effects on other indicators of
performance, however, though this may reflect the relatively short
period that the new owners have had to implement restructuring.
Policy conclusions are drawn in the seventh section.
2. ALTERNATIVE OWNERSHIP FORMS AND
ENTERPRISE BEHAVIOR:  SOME HYPOTHESES
Although the literature on transition has stressed that
privatization is a critical component of the transition process, there
have been few attempts to evaluate the comparative strengths and
weaknesses of alternative majority ownership structures for the newly
privatized companies.  Earle and Estrin (1995) argue that the balance
of advantage shifts between different ownership forms according to the
problem under consideration.  For example, outsider ownership may
offer superior access to external capital markets but may also cause
greater social dislocation, while worker ownership may slow
employment restructuring.  In this section, we provide a simplified
4comparison of alternative majority ownership forms in achieving four
widely accepted objectives of the transition1, namely:
- developing a politically independent and market oriented
enterprise sector, which we term "depoliticization"2
- long term restructuring
- short term restructuring
- minimizing transaction costs associated with further
evolution of ownership
The hypothesized impact of each ownership form, relative to one
another and against the base case of state ownership, is reported in
Figure 1.  The figure summarizes the analysis which follows, and
indicates, for example, the predicted extent of depoliticization in
worker owned firms, relative both to state ownership and the other
ownership forms.  But a few words of caution are needed.  Firstly, the
figure summarizes results derived from theoretical models of 100%
ownership by one or another group.  However in defining our five
ownership forms empirically, we take a majority stake, (or indeed the
largest single stake if other holdings are diversified), as implying
effective control of the firm.  This may be misleading.  In practice, the
largest group of owners may have highly diversified holdings, while
minority interests may be highly concentrated, giving the latter effective
control.  For example, enterprises classified as worker-owned according
to ownership stake may actually be managerially controlled.  We return
to this issue below.
Moreover, there are many assumptions behind the hypothesized
behavior in the table, not all of which will always be satisfied.  Three
cases will suffice.  First, the extent of restructuring will typically be
greater when product and factor markets are more competitive, ceteris
paribus.  If sectoral and regional diversity is sufficient, these elements
might swamp any independent ownership effects.  Second, the precise
institutional form of different ownership types may significantly affect
behavior.  Thus, firms owned collectively by workers with limited share
5tradeability might be expected to perform much worse than those
owned by workers on the basis of individually held and freely tradeable
shares. Finally,  the situation of the firm itself is relevant.  Profitability
clearly assists restructuring regardless of ownership form.  On the other
hand, collective employee ownership might be beneficial in situations
of extreme loss-making by geographically isolated firms, because such
a form allows workers to trade wages for employment security.  These
provisos aside, the figure reports predictions about the relative impact
of alternative ownership forms on restructuring.  The arguments are
summarized in the following subsections.
2.1 Developing a Politically Independent and Market Oriented
Enterprise Sector 
A fundamental objective for new ownership structures in
transitional economies is to promote the clarification of property rights,
and to establish new objectives of the firm.  All privatizations assign
titles of ownership to particular individuals.  But founding a new
relationship with the state involves ensuring the freedom of firms from
arbitrary interference and a radical reorientation of goals from seeking
rents to satisfying the demands of the market, (see Boycko, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1993), Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994)).
Relative to state ownership, de novo private and outside private
ownership seem likely to be best able to ensure depoliticization of the
firm and reorientation of objectives.  To the extent that the new owners
are entrepreneurs, they will less be a part of the old order and perhaps
also have more restricted access to the flow of subsidies3.  Insiders will
also have incentives to increase economic profits, since they personally
stand to gain via their shareholdings.  But they may also have closer
ties to the state bureaucracy, and greater opportunities to pursue
special concessions than outsiders or new entrepreneurs. 
Within the category of insiders, one might also predict a
difference between managerial and worker ownership.   If budget
constraints are soft, it is arguable that transfers of ownership either to
6managers or to workers will have little or no effect on enterprise
behavior because both sets of new owners will remain motivated to
maximize rents rather than profits or earnings per worker.  Insider
privatization is therefore unlikely to bring many benefits until budget
constraints are tightened.  Under somewhat harder budget constraints,
the net returns to profit as against rent seeking will be determined by
both the opportunity costs and the benefits, which are in turn affected
by the prospects of the firm, its environment, the political situation, etc.
However, there may be some differences between employee and
managerial ownership in this respect.  Workers represent a new and
more diffuse group of owners than managers, who are generally
survivors from an earlier period, maintaining their good connections
and bad habits. The costs to seek rents may be higher for worker owned
firms than those under managerial ownership because the former
organization may have more diffuse and heterogeneous objectives.
More importantly, the benefits to rent-seeking may be lower in
employee-owned firms because managers, given their longstanding
connections under the previous regime, may be more effective at
extracting subsidies.  Managers may also be able to achieve higher
returns to rent seeking because they may be better able to appropriate
the rents for themselves personally, or because there are fewer of them
among whom to share the spoils.  In such circumstances, insider
privatization to employee owners, by weakening the old relationships,
might be superior to managerial ownership.  However, we predict that
both will prove inferior on this score to outsider privatization.
2.2 Long Term Restructuring
We focus on three issues here: unbundling, organizational
structure and investment. The boundaries of firms in a market economy
are supposed to be determined by efficiency considerations:  the costs
and benefits of integration. But in socialist economies, as emphasized
by Kornai (1991), the relationship between the managers of firms and
their superiors, whether the director of a trust or a branch minister,
7differed little from the relationship between the manager and the
foreman or production supervisor under his/her direction.  An
important element in the transition process is therefore to reorganize
the groups of productive units which previously comprised the
enterprise sector to form a new industrial structure in which the
boundaries of the firms minimize internal transactions costs.  
A  market orientation should also be reflected in changes in
enterprise organizational form. The structure of the organization should
be adapted to be able to respond to the changing demands of
customers, to ensure adequate mechanisms for managerial control, and
to provide appropriate information for rational decision-making.  This
may involve for example the establishment of new functional divisions
within the firms suitable for finance or marketing, and the development
of new control and monitoring systems.  Finally long-term restructuring
involves investment in capital equipment, to introduce new
technologies, to raise quality standards, to broaden product
differentiation, and to address input wastage and its environmental
consequences.  An important issue is the ability of different ownership
forms to mobilize capital  and to introduce new technologies.
Restructuring, both long and short term, are primarily problems
faced by current and former state owned firms, so we exclude de novo
private firms from these comparisons.4  Provided outsiders are able to
exercise their nominal property rights, outsider ownership is probably
the form best suited to long term restructuring.  This is because given
their profit orientation, outside owners will take the most dispassionate
view of existing production and organizational structures, and because
in principle they suffer least from agency problems in their dealings
with external capital markets.  Insider owned firms might be predicted
to suffer more serious difficulties in raising outside capital because of
the agency problems faced by lenders and minority investors (see eg
Shleifer and Vasilyev (1995), Hansmann (1990) for summaries).
Ownership by managers is also likely to dominate that of
nonmanagerial employees in redefining the appropriate boundaries of
the firm.  Worker ownership may still be superior to state ownership
8because rearranging the boundaries of the firm will be possible
provided the employee gainers can compensate the losers.  In principle,
even highly egalitarian employee-owned firms with high solidarity may
therefore be able to undertake some restructuring and unbundling
provided it offers a potential Pareto improvement and some form of
compensation package can be agreed upon.
In some situations, however, this compensation will not be
possible and potential Pareto improvements will not be convertible into
actual Pareto improvements (for instance, because lump-sum transfers
are infeasible or because of severe capital market imperfections).  The
biggest problems are likely to arise due to the difficulties of collective
decision-making under uncertainty, and particularly when some groups
of workers are earning supra-competitive rents.  Many enterprises have
a large number of restructuring paths which they could potentially
follow, for instance changing product lines, re-organizing company
divisions, or adopting different kinds of new technologies, but each has
different implications for the value of the human capital of various
groups of workers in the company.  Given that the profit associated
with each path is also greatly uncertain, each group of workers will try
to block paths which seem likely to downgrade their own skills.  Thus,
it may not be difficult for blocking coalitions to form ex ante,
preventing ex post desirable restructuring. 
In resolving these agency problems, managerially owned firms
have a clear advantage. They will be motivated to undertake any
restructuring or rearrangements in the boundaries of the firm which
increase profits.  Supra-competitive wages may be reduced and workers
laid off with little or no compensation.  Agency problems apart,
managerial ownership can therefore potentially yield restructuring
benefits analogous to those of investor ownership, greater than those
under worker ownership. 
2.3 Short Term Restructuring
9The transition process demands that firms become responsive in
the short term to market signals in terms of both the products they
choose to supply and in their use of factor inputs.  In firms for which
the optimal level of output has fallen, the ownership system must be
able to effect large decreases in employment and other inputs.  Due to
the inherited technologies and the production practices which were
wasteful in the use of inputs, including energy and labor, new owners
must have the incentives and the ability to ensure that costs are
reduced, that the factor mix is rationalized, that productivity is raised,
and that quality is improved. These are the standard problems of
restructuring (see eg Belka et al (1994), Estrin et al (1993)).
Once again, one predicts outside owners to have less qualms than
insiders about reducing employment, and other short term restructuring
measures.  However, they might be unable to exercise their property
rights in such sensitive areas, especially if insiders refuse to cooperate.
Moreover, if product or factor markets are relatively more competitive
and budget constraints hard, insiders may be forced to restructure and
improve their efficiency in order to survive.
Comparing managerial and worker ownership, it is important to
stress that both have equivalent incentives to increase economic profits
and to cut non-labor costs.  But worker-controlled firms are likely to
perpetuate even more than managerially owned ones inefficiencies in
the allocation of labor.  However, the flip side is that worker owners
would probably be able to get rid of managers more easily.  In cases
where managerial turnover is a sine qua non for the firm to be turned
around, managerial ownership has the disadvantage of entrenching bad
managers.
2.4 Evolution of Governance Form
The transition process involves dynamic adjustment by
organizations to changed and changing economic circumstances.  The
outcome of the process may be path dependent, and the appropriate
institutional arrangements may gradually change as the process unfolds.
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In such circumstances, it may not be possible to specify ex ante the
optimal ownership structure but it would be desirable that whatever
structure is first selected should have the flexibility to evolve as the
dynamic path of transformation proceeds.  The lower the transaction
costs involved in exchanging ownership rights, the less binding the
initial allocation of ownership rights, because markets would emerge
to ensure a reallocation to achieve better matching of owners with
assets.  Institutions concerning property rights should therefore be
designed to lower those transaction costs and to facilitate the
development of financial markets.  The new ownership configuration
should also minimize the probability of degeneration back to state
ownership.
Widespread ownership by outsiders, whether de novo or in
privatized firms, is likely to encourage the development of secondary
markets and thus further the evolutionary process of matching and
rematching assets with owners.  In contrast, concentrated insider
ownership will discourage the development of takeover markets,
because the lack of liquidity in small numbers of shares implies that it
may be very difficult in a takeover action to earn the control premium
on minority stakes previously acquired; thus rematching is inhibited.
If worker shareholdings are widely dispersed, secondary markets may
develop more easily than if shares are concentrated in the hands of a
few managers.  Although still difficult, it may be somewhat easier for
outsiders to take over companies by buying up small numbers of shares
than by negotiating with a single manager or a small group of managers.
The reason is that, while there may be a collective interest of the
insiders to keep out outsiders, individual employees may "free ride" by
selling their small holdings to outsiders. Concentrated insider holdings
are more likely to lead to entrenchment because of the informational
advantage of insiders over outsiders.  In an environment of great
uncertainty over the prospects for any company and lack of financial
markets functioning to provide estimates of value, the concentration of
holdings together with the asymmetry of information may give rise to
adverse selection in the market for corporate control.  
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2.5 Summary of Hypotheses
In summary, outside ownership is predicted to provide the
greatest progress towards our four objectives for enterprises in
transition; where relevant this performance would be matched by de
novo owners.  Insider privatization is expected to be superior to state
ownership, but worse than majority outsider control.  If we compare
forms of insider ownership, worker ownership is hypothesized to have
deficiencies in long term restructuring, especially rearranging the
boundaries of the firm, and short term restructuring when  employment
levels are at issue, but perhaps to be superior in terms of
depoliticization and in the evolution of governance structure.
3. INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF RUSSIAN
PRIVATIZATION
The Russian mass privatization involved large-scale giveaways to
insiders on the argument that there was no politically feasible
alternative form of privatization.  This is because managers and workers
had already accumulated tremendous political influence and
enterprises, had gained significant autonomy and de facto property
rights.  Early methods of ownership decentralization under Perestroika
had already emphasized leasing arrangements, eventually resulting in
insider buyouts at highly preferential prices.  
The institutional features implied by the State Privatization
Program seem straightforward.  The legal form of enterprises is an
open, individually owned joint stock company and shares are in
principle fully tradable, and voting rights (of voting shares) freely and
equally exercised.  But there are some important qualifications relevant
to our hypotheses above, which we list in increasing order of
importance.  First, in addition to the better known ways in which
workers were able to acquire shares, there was possibility of a kind of
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ESOP, the FARP (Fund of Workers' Shares).  On average the FARP
seems to hold only a minor fraction of shares, but may sometimes be
more significant, exercising a governance role and/or restraining share
trading5.  Second, under the "Option 1" method of privatization, 25
percent of company shares were given to company employees
free-of-charge, but under the condition that they be non-voting6.  Third,
as noted above, many companies were privatized outside of the State
Privatization Program, generally through the buyout of a lease granted
to the workers' collective during the years of Perestroika.  According
to Webster et al (1994), "almost all former leaseholds were either
closed joint stock or limited liability companies..." (page 11).  In closed
joint stock companies, share trading is permitted only among
employees and with the approval of the workers' collective (which
apparently survives in many firms).
Furthermore, many observers question the degree to which the
legal institutions function in practice, even in nominally open joint
stock companies.  For instance, there seems to be some evidence of
ESOP-like trusts forming with the motivation of stifling worker
influence.  According to Blasi (1994), many managers intended to form
a trust for the employees' shares in order to control how those shares
were voted.  More generally, voting rights may not always be freely
exercised.  Managers have reportedly often postponed the first general
meeting of shareholders after privatization, and voting is said to be
sometimes conducted neither by secret ballot nor in proportion to
shareholdings.  Despite frequent press accounts, it is difficult to obtain
reliable information on such practices or to estimate their prevalence.
There also seem to be many constraints on the tradeability of
shares, resulting partly from attempts by insiders to prevent the entry
of outside investors and partly from the limited development of
secondary markets.  Probably the best evidence for the poor
possibilities for share trading was the extremely low cash value of
vouchers and implied low value of company shares7.  Because the cash
value of vouchers was determined, for the most part, by transactions
involving minority investors, it seems likely that the control premium
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in this case is simply enormous:  outsiders have little willingness to pay
for minority stakes in insider-controlled firms8.
Finally, we come to the issue of residual softness of budget
constraints.  Little change in enterprise behavior can be expected to
result from ownership changes in situations where firms systematically
do not bear the costs or win the benefits of their actions.  It is often
assumed that subsidy reductions are necessarily associated with
privatization, but in Russia this may not be true.  Indeed, shortly after
the voucher privatization process began, and no doubt intended to
encourage that process to move forward, Yeltsin signed a State Decree
"On Not Permitting Discrimination Against Privatized Enterprises in the
Provision of State Financial Support" (November 27, 1992).
Nonetheless, there seems to be agreement that subsidies and money
creation have generally been declining in 1993 and 1994, so that the
"non-discrimination" may be starting to apply in the sense of hard
budget constraints for all.  If true, then privatization could begin
affecting behavior in Russia.  We examine the evidence provided by the
survey on these points below. 
4. CORPORATE CONTROL IN RUSSIAN ENTERPRISES
In our subsequent empirical work, we address whether firms
owned by different groups of majority of dominant owners behave
differently.  The five categories of ownership groups were constructed
as follows.  The firm in the sample were first classified  according to
whether they were old enterprises (privatized or state owned (SO)) or
new private ones (DNs)9.  Categories for the possible controlling
interests in the old firms were then defined on the basis of the
information on legal form, method of privatization, status of
privatization, and the structure of ownership, the latter given by the
percentage of voting shares held at the time of interview by ten
categories of owners10. 
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Old firms were then categorized into state and those claiming
their company "has been privatized"11. The latter companies were
designated as outsider-owned (OO) if banks, investment funds, other
domestic firms, foreign institutions, and individuals other than
employees together held more than the combined total for insiders12.
Insider-owned companies were considered to be managerially
controlled (MO) when the percentage of shares held by managers was
at least as great as that held by non-managerial employees.  Those
which had a larger share held by non-managerial employees we
classified as worker-owned (WO)13. 
Table 1 reports information on the ownership structure, of the
439 companies in the sample.  Of these, 45 are DNs, and 325 are old
firms, of which 110 still have a dominant state share and 214 are
majority privatized14.  The sample of state owned and privatized firms
was randomly drawn from a list of the population of industrial firms
employing more than 15 workers, to which were added a
predetermined number of de novo firms. The data therefore provide an
opportunity, which is particularly valuable in the absence of
comprehensive official statistics, to measure the ownership outcome of
the Russian privatization process.  Workers have become dominant
owners in a majority of cases:  WOs account for 138 firms, 65 percent
of the total; 19 percent, or 40 firms, are MOs; while the remaining 16
percent, 36 firms, are OOs.  Among all privatized companies, workers
hold an (unweighted) average of 47.5 percent of all shares, and
managers hold 20.8, which yields a total insider stake of 68.3 percent,
over two-thirds of all shares.  The remainder is divided between the
state (10.7 percent) and outsiders (19.7 percent), while 1.1 percent of
the shares were owned by non-classifiable "others."15
The sample contains significant diversity in terms of category of
dominant owner, which makes it well-suited for our purpose of relating
these categories to various aspects of the firms' behavior.  There also
appears to be an association between the extent of share ownership
held by workers and that held by outsiders:  both are more likely to
own shares in a company dominated by the other than they are to own
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shares in a company dominated by either managers or the state.
Managers and outsiders seem particularly loathe to own shares in one
another's companies.  In addition, the state seems to exhibit a slight
preference for share ownership in companies dominated by managers
over those dominated by workers and those by outsiders.  Together,
these results provide some evidence against the somewhat prevalent
views (for instance, in Webster et al (1994)), that managers and
workers are in close coalition with one another in privatized Russian
firms and that managers are more likely than workers to become
independent of the state.
Official data on the ownership structure of the newly privatized
companies is unavailable.  However, our results on ownership shares
are of the same order as those obtained from three earlier surveys that
attempted to obtain some of this information for samples of privatized
companies.  In Pistor's (1993) sample of 36 firms, all employees
together received an average of 61.8 percent of all shares, while
outsiders had 19 percent on average, and the State Property Fund
retained 19.3 percent.  Blasi's (1994) survey of 127 privatized firms
found 90 percent with majority employee ownership.  On average, all
insiders had 65 percent of shares in his sample, with a median of 60
percent.16  Finally, Webster et al (1994) reports on a survey conducted
in October 1993 of 92 privatized firms in Moscovskaya and
Vladimirskaya oblasts.  On average, only 10 percent of shares remained
with the state from these companies, managers had 17 percent, and
workers have 61 percent.  
These studies of course rely on small non-random samples, and
did not have information on key aspects of ownership rights, such as
whether shares were voting or non-voting.  Our findings also differ,
particularly insofar as the managerial stake in the companies in our
sample is significantly larger17 and because we did find a significant
number of outsider-controlled companies among those privatized.   The
survey was also conducted later, and there may, of course, have been
some evolution of the ownership structure, although most
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commentators believe such changes have been so far minimal, (see
Blasi and Shleifer (1994)).
Tables 2 to 4 provide information on other characteristics of our
sample by our categories of ownership.  Table 2 reports the breakdown
according to legal form for 415 companies for which this information
is available.  Among privatized companies, the joint stock form
overwhelmingly predominates, with 90 percent of the total, but, we are
unable to distinguish closed from open joint stock companies.  DNs
exhibit a wider variety of forms; the largest number are individual
entrepreneurships.
In Table 3, the distribution by industrial branch is shown, and in
Table 4 the distribution by region.  In order to control for differences
in technologies and in shocks across firms, we have disaggregated
branches according to the major product, which results in 26 roughly
two-digit industrial branches. The survey instrument also asked which
firms were part of the military-industrial complex (MIC); 53 of the 369
placed themselves in that category, as against 14 in the defence sector.
Around 60% of MIC firms remain state owned, a higher proportion
than of all firms, and of the around 40% which have been privatized,
more than half are worker owned.  Table 3A gives a simpler picture of
the distribution of ownership classes across sectors.   Sectors can be
combined into 4 main groups: Group 1 includes sectors 1 and 2; Group
2 sectors 3-13; Group 3 sectors 14-20; and Group 4 sectors 21-26.
65% of enterprises in Group 1 (fuel and energy) are SO, 20% are WO,
10% are MO, 5% are OO with no DN's.  Clearly the state still controls
these sectors of the economy, perhaps to levy taxes on their profits.  In
Group 2 around 70% of enterprises are SO and WO.  These sectors
need considerable investments but their products are in demand.  67%
of enterprises in Group 3 are also SO and WO, perhaps so the state can
continue to control such sectors as electronics.  In Group 4 workers
control more than 45% and the state less than 20% of enterprises,
perhaps because these sectors require lower levels of investment.
Regarding regions, we have combined similar groups of oblasts
into 9 regions closely following the usual division of the Russian
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Federation into 12 economic regions which differ in the level of
economic development and infrastructure, the availability of natural
and human resources, their fields of specialization and their geographic
locations.  Due to a small number of observations in some regions,
however, we have combined the regions of the North and North-West,
Central and Central-Chernozem, and Eastern Siberia and Far East.  In
Kaliningrad, we had no observations, and we treat Moscow as a
separate region18.
5. OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN RUSSIAN FIRMS
What do these data on the structure of ownership imply for who
controls Russian firms and for enterprise behavior?  Despite the
relatively small proportion of managerially dominated firms, and of
managerial ownership generally, most observers believe that top
managers have remained firmly in control (eg Blasi (1994), Boycko,
Shleifer and Vishny (1993)).  In this section we look at the reported
degree of "influence" over various types of decisions exercised by
different owners, to test whether nominal ownership and effective
controls are positively correlated.
"Influence" is measured in our data as a qualitative variable which
can take on one of three values:  "rarely or never influential" (1),
"moderate influence" (2), or "dominant, most important" (3).  We
assume that these categories are adequate proxies for participation in
decision-making concerning the firm's operation and analyze their
relationship with ownership shares.
Tables 5A, 5B, 5C, and 5D contain the means, by ownership-
control type, of the reported influence of several kinds of "actors"19
over four different types of decisions:  (A) sales, production, marketing,
and current operations; (B) employment, hiring and firing of workers,
and social and non-wage benefits; (C) employment, hiring and firing of
management, and managerial compensation; (D) allocation of profits,
major investments, sale or lease of major assets, and financial issues
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generally.  One might expect the influence of outside owners to be
greater in D than the other decision areas; of workers to be relatively
greater in B; and of managers in A.  One would also expect dominant
owners to have significantly more influence than other actors in general
on decision-making.
In fact, none of these propositions seems to hold for these data.
Rather, in every firm "management and executive boards" are reported
to have the greatest influence on all types of decisions.  They are
closely followed by managerial shareholders, while at first glance all
other actors dwindle into insignificance.
There are however a few specific areas in which dominant
ownership category impacts upon control over enterprise decisions.
First, we note that worker shareholder control is consistently greatly on
average than the influence accorded to any other decision-making set
of actors, though markedly less than managerial influence.  In this
regard, it is particularly worrisome that workers are seen as moderately
influential over the allocation of profit, especially in worker owned
firms.  This sits slightly uneasily with studies which dismiss the
influence of workers outright (see eg Blasi and Shleifer (1995)).  The
flip side is that we find limited evidence of outside owners, either
individuals or institutions, having significant influence over enterprise
decisions, though outsiders do have some influence over financial
decisions in OOs, and banks on production and sales.  This weak
outside control is despite the fact that the survey suggests that their
shareholdings are considerable (15% on average) and that they are
dominant shareholders in around 15% of privatized firms.  This
suggests that, rather than searching for changed shareholdings, one has
to look to changes in control and behavior before applauding the
gradual increase in outsider shareholdings in Russian firms.  Finally, we
note a continued, if secondary, influence of the state, especially in state
owned firms and in decisions regarding production and the allocation
of profit.
We go on to investigate more systematically whether these
measures of influence are associated with the magnitude of ownership
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stakes using correlation analysis.  Table 6 contains simple correlation
coefficients between influence and ownership share.  The coefficients
are typically low and relatively few are statistically significant20.
However, it is interesting to note that the two groups upon whom
higher ownership confers significantly more influence are managers,
over the issues of long run resource allocation, and outside individual
owners, over all issues except question of short run sales and
production.   Banks as owners also appear to be able to exercise some
control via their shareholding over production decisions.  Worker
shareholdings are positively correlated with influence, especially over
questions of managerial employment and long run allocative issues, but
the effect is not quite significant.
These results might be taken as evidence for the common view
that Russian managers are largely in control of their firms, regardless
of share ownership (see Blasi (1994), Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1993), and Shleifer and Vasilyev (1994)).  It must be remembered,
however, that in all cases the evidence relies on the self-reported
perceptions of managers themselves.  The widespread self-confidence
of managers does not in itself constitute sufficient evidence.  Table 6
suggests that the higher shareholding yields greater influence, both to
outsiders and to banks, and while the evidence on worker
shareholdings is weaker, one could imagine a normally quiescent
workforce intervening to prevent drastic restructuring.  We therefore go
on to examine how closely the objectives of the firm, as demonstrated
through observable actions, follow the interests of dominant
shareholder groups.  
6. OWNERSHIP AND ENTERPRISE BEHAVIOR
In this section, we analyze empirically whether different
structures of shareholding influence enterprise behavior in Russia.  In
particular, we test some of the hypotheses outlined in the second
section about the relative effects of privatizing to different dominant
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ownership groups.  We report our findings in three subsections,
namely,
- changing the nature of the economic  relationship between
the firm and the state ("depoliticization")
- long and short term restructuring strategies ("reorientation")
- short term enterprise performance eg in employment, sales,
exports etc.
The latter two subsections conflate the second and third "objectives of
transition" from section 2 above, in a manner dictated by the data. 
Unlike in the previous section, where we looked at both the
number of shares held by each ownership group, and firms categorized
according to dominant owner, in the work which follows we look only
at the five ownership groups by controlling shareholder interest.  Our
general approach is to use regression analysis to investigate whether
there are statistically significant differences in enterprise performance
by dominant ownership category, and if so, whether these differences
persist once we control for sectoral, regional, and firm-specific sources
of heterogeneity within each ownership class.
Our approach is to estimate four OLS regressions on each
indicator of performance, commencing just with the ownership
dummies, then adding a lagged endogenous variable (where available),
then including sectoral and regional dummies and finally also
controlling for size by employment in 1991.  The simplest equation
provides information on the distribution of performance by ownership
types.  The second is a dynamic specification which indicates the
impact of ownership on change in performance. Neither of these
equations include any other explanatory variables, and they are
intended to describe in a statistically meaningful way the differences
between the ownership groups.  The third equation tests whether
ownership effects on the change in performance can be isolated when
a fuller set of explanatory variables has been included as independent
variables to control for firm specific heterogeneity in the data set.  In
the absence of a formal model to guide the choice of independent
variable, and for parsimony and consistency between equations, we
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prefer to report only regressions which control for competitive market
pressures and locational effects, picked up by sectoral and regional
dummies respectively21.  However, since the size of the firm may be an
important variable for certain aspects of Russian transition, especially
when comparing de novo with current and former state owned firms,
we sometimes also report a final equation which further includes a
proxy for firm size, namely employment in 199122.  This helps in the
analysis of the relative performance of de novo firms, which could
perform differently because they are new and private, or because they
are new and small (see Richter and Schaffer (1995)23.
6.1. Distancing From the State
In this subsection, we investigate the hypothesis that, relative to
state ownership, outsider owned firms, and especially DNs, will be the
most successful in distancing themselves from the state.  Between
managerially and worker-owned firms, we want to test whether worker-
owned firms become relatively less dependent on the state than their
managerially owned counterparts.
Our initial approach is descriptive.  In Table 7 we report several
proxies for state influence in, and support for, enterprises.  The first
three variables concern sales of products to state-customers, the
argument being that the relationship between the enterprise and the
state will be closer in enterprises producing primarily for procurement,
whether military or not. PRFORST2 is the percentage of revenue from
all "government customers," while PRFORST4 is the percentage of
revenue from the sale of what we infer to be publicly procured goods24.
According to both measures, government sales are most important to
SOs, followed in order by MOs and OOs, but they are least important
to WOs.  Although the standard deviations are large enough to suggest
caution in interpreting the results, on average it does appear that the
WOs have the least supply ties to the state among old companies.
Surprisingly however, the proportion of total revenue derived from
government sales on the part of DNs is quite high -- 30.8 percent --
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perhaps providing evidence of some dependency also of the new private
sector on the state in Russia.
PROFORST measures the change in the percentage of revenue
derived from sales of publicly procured goods since 199025.  The
decrease averaged only 2.6 percent, with the size of the decline directly
related to the current level, so that these sales fell the most in SOs,
followed by MOs, OOs, and WOs.  Regression results are reported in
Table 8.1.  In the first column, the only independent variables are
dummies for dominant owner groups.  We confirm that WOs, OOs, and
DNs receive a smaller percentage of their revenue from the state,
differences which are significant at the one percent level (for WOs), the
five percent level (for DNs), and the ten percent level (for OOs).  But
these results are level rather than rate of change phenomena; they
vanish in the second column, where PRFORST4 from 1990 is added to
the right-hand side.  The lagged dependent variable has a coefficient of
.66, which, with a T-statistic of 27.5, accounts for much of the
variation in current sales to the state.  This is evidence that there is
significant inertia in sales to the state.  The third column shows the
results from adding controls for sector and region, many of which are
significant, but the most important explanatory variable remains the 4-
year lagged dependent variable.  In the latter two equations, we do not
pick up any significant differences across ownership forms.  This
suggests that the significant rankings by ownership type are selection
effects by history, region and sector, and the ownership category is not
yet significantly affecting the pace of change of sales to the state.
Although it is unlikely to be under the direct influence of
enterprises, the continuing existence of price controls does reflect
lingering state involvement in enterprise behavior, as well as an issue
for which influence costs could be quite high.  Such controls persist
largely through the ability of local governments to constrain the size of
markups.  PRICONT in Table 7 is a dummy variable equal to one if the
firm reports that there are "price controls or fixed profit margins on
[their] major products," and zero otherwise.  By this measure, prices are
far from fully liberalized in Russia, with a full 57 percent of SOs
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reporting price controls.  Distinctly fewer privatized companies, 30-32
percent, face controls on their output prices, and the fraction for DNs,
24 percent, is still less, although the levels are high in absolute terms.
We now turn to the vexed issue of state support for the enterprise
sector.  ARRTOST measures the percentage of tax liabilities which
were more than three months overdue as of April 1, 1994.  This follows
exactly our predicted pattern.  Arrears were highest among SOs at 20
percent, followed by MOs and WOs at 13 percent, OOs and DNs at 6
percent.  The next two variables measure loans received with state
support.  STATLOAN is a dummy variable taking the value of one if
either of the company's two largest outstanding loans was received from
or mandated or guaranteed by the Central Bank or any state agency and
the value of 0 otherwise.  20 percent of SOs receive such loans, while
only 13-14 percent of privatized companies and only 9 percent of new
private firms do.  A measure of preferential credits is PREFLOAN, the
percentage of all loans for which the interest rate is below the discount
rate of the CBR.  Once again, SOs receive the best treatment:  22.1
percent of their loans are preferential, compared to 20.6 percent among
OOs, 15.2 percent among WOs, 14.0 percent among DNs, and 6.4
percent on average for MOs.
The final set of variables we have to measure the extent of
depoliticization consists of various indicators of direct government
assistance to the companies.   As shown in Table 7, GOVSUP92,
GOVSUP93 and GOVSUP94, are dummy variables equal to one if the
enterprise admitted receiving any type of support from the state --
subsidies, investments, tax benefits or exemptions, preferential credits,
or others -- in 1992, 1993, and 1994, respectively.  The percentage of
companies reporting support rose from 22 percent in 1992 to 32
percent in 1993 before falling back to 26 percent in 1994.  The highest
percentage of companies is for the group of SOs, of whom 39 percent
received support in 1994.  Surprisingly, OOs were next with 31
percent, followed by MOs and WOs with 20 and DNs as expected were
least with 16 percent.
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This pattern is confirmed from estimating logistic regressions with
GOVSUP94 as dependent variable are shown in Table 8.2.  Also
before, the first column shows the simple specification where only
ownership dummies are included on the right-hand side.  DNs, WOs,
and MOs have a significantly lower probability of receiving state
support than do SOs, while between SOs and OOs there is no
statistically significant difference.  The results in columns 2 and 3,
however, make evident that there is quite significant persistence in the
receipt of government support:  the lagged dependent variable is highly
significant in both equations, implying that the same firms receiving
support in 1993 also tended to receive it in 1994.  It is impressive that
the coefficient on WOs remains statistically significant in these
regressions, implying a systematic regularity that more worker owned
firms lost support in 1994.
The reported total value (in current mln RBS) of all of the same
categories of government assistance are represented in Table 7 by
GOVASS92, GOVASS93, and GOVASS94 for 1992, 1993, and 1994,
respectively26.  Assistance declined sharply in 1994, to about 20
percent of its real value in 1993, once privatization had been
accomplished.  Mean assistance is highest in SOs, next highest in OOs,
followed by WOs, MOs, and DNs.  Privatized firms received
substantially fewer subsidies than did state-owned enterprises.  Because
ownership types also differ by size, we divided government assistance
by employment; GASS94BE equals the ratio of GOVASS94 to
employment in 1994.  Scaling by size reduces the difference between
dominant owner types, while preserving their order in the receipt of
assistance.  The change in this ratio from 1993 to 1994 is variable
GASS43BE, which showed there was little nominal change, but a
strong real decline in all the enterprises which we could classify by
dominant owner.  For example, WOs received only 42 percent of the
assistance per employee in 1994 compared to what they received in
1993 (measured in 1994 rubles), while OOs received about 32 percent,
and MOs about 28 percent.  By these measures, Russian budget
constraints seem to have hardened quite significantly in 1994.
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The regression results in Table 8.3 provide further support for this
conclusion.  In column 1, GOVASS94 is regressed only on ownership
dummies, demonstrating again that the lower level of assistance
provided to WOs, MOs, and DNs is statistically significantly lower than
that for SOs, while the OOs show no clear difference.  Column 2 adds
the lagged values of the dependent variable, which, as with the previous
Table 8.2, reduces most of the ownership dummies to insignificance.
The coefficient on WO however remains negative and significant.  In
the following column, however, where sector and regional dummies are
added, even the WO dummy loses significance. 
In this sub-section, we have looked at government enterprise
relations in terms of procurement, price controls and subsidy.  The
findings taken together conform with our prior hypotheses - the
influence of the state via these three channels is most marked in the
remaining state owned firms, and least in de novo private firms.  Insider
privatization does act to break the links with the state, though more
markedly in worker-owned than managerially owned firms.
Surprisingly however, the relationship between the state and outsider
firms remains very strong, comparable to that in state owned firms.
This could be explained by selection effects:  outsiders may have
tended to take control in firms historically closely connected with the
state.  In any case, our results demonstrate the powerful inertia in the
relationship between the state and the enterprise sector.
6.2. Reorientation of Firm's Objectives and Restructuring
We hypothesized in the second section that privatized firms,
particularly those which are outsider-controlled, may be superior to
state-owned firms in most areas of restructuring.  In comparing insider-
controlled firms, worker ownership might lead to relatively less
unbundling, investment and reduction of labor costs than managerial
ownership.  We test these hypotheses in this section using qualitative
data from the questionnaire recording managers' own views about their
restructuring strategies.  The questions cover four areas of enterprise
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decision-making:  production, marketing, employment policy, and
investment.  Managers are invited to indicate their priorities across a
variety of responses in each area, being allowed to respond on a scale
from 1 (not important) to 3 (very important) for each response.  The
results are tabulated in Table 9, which reports the rank order of
responses by ownership type and the average response on the 1 to 3
scale.
In sharp contrast to the findings concerning depoliticization, we
see little evidence that majority ownership stakes are yet influencing
restructuring strategies among privatized firms, though DNs are clearly
somewhat different.  The most striking thing about Table 9 is how little
the responses vary by ownership type.  For example the mean response
across the ten possible actions under the heading of production strategy
varies between 1.94 and 2.06.  The variation is in fact hardly greater
within any particular answer.  It is perhaps encouraging, however, that
marketing and investment/finance strategies are on average regarded as
slightly more important than production or employment strategies,
regardless of ownership type. 
Commencing with production strategy, the rank orders of
importance are remarkably similar in all five ownership types.  The
ranks in Table 9 rise with the importance attached to a strategy, so we
note that all firms attach least significance in their production strategy
to disposing of assets, seeking foreign consultants and closing plants or
shops, and most importance to increasing the efficiency of input use
and to investments.  The only major exceptions are privately owned
firms, which presumably are not encumbered with poor practices, at
least to the same extent.  Hence as we would expect they place less
importance on investment policy, changing product mix and improving
efficiency of resource use, and emphasize, even more than other
ownership groups, technology, product quality and investment.
Privately owned firms are also rather different in terms of
employment strategies; employment reductions are seen as much less
important, presumably because being new organizations, they have not
inherited the bloated labor forces of current and former state owned
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firms.  However, apart from this, the similarities across ownership types
are much more revealing than the differences and not entirely
consistent with the view of unconstrained managerial control.  In all
ownership forms, the most important strategy by far on the labor side
is an increase in wages, followed by the desire to increase wage
differentials.  Outsider-owned firms however place slightly more stress
on establishing an internal wage structure than insider-owned firms
however, and surprisingly slightly less weight on employment
reduction.
Turning to investment strategy, some modest differences begin to
appear within the private group.  New private firms place particular
emphasis on seeking foreign investors and reducing bank borrowing.
A similar stress on foreign investment is placed by both state and
worker-owned firms.  However, managerially owned firms in particular,
and outsider firms also, shy away somewhat from foreign involvement;
perhaps in the case of the latter category because foreign advice and
capital is less needed and in the case of the former because it would
threaten managerial entrenchment.  Outside owners also place less
stress on obtaining new loans than any other ownership form.
On the marketing side, all ownership types rate an improvement
of marketing and discovering new domestic markets very highly, but
place less emphasis on price adjustments or changing suppliers.  One
intriguing difference, however, is that managerially owned firms place
less weight on increasing exports, while state and worker-owned firms
regard international markets as being of potentially greater importance.
6.3 Enterprise Performance
We conclude our evaluation of the impact of different majority
ownership forms by looking, not at the self-reported intentions of
managers, but at the behavior of their firms.  We report the result of
regression analysis undertaken to analyze various elements of company
performance in Russia, including sales, employment, exports and pay.
Means of the variables under consideration by ownership type are
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outlined in Table 10, where some differences by ownership type do
emerge, though the standard deviations are typically large.
The first variable in Table 10 is sales in 1994.  State-owned firms
are much the largest enterprises, followed by worker-owned,
managerially owned, outsider-owned and privately owned.  The five
types of firms in fact increased sales at a similar average rate between
1992 and 1994.  Size according to employment shows a similar pattern.
The Russian firms in our sample are not major exporters outside the
former Soviet Union; on average only 4 percent of sales go to such
customers and the maximum observed in the whole sample is only 20
percent of total sales.  Non-FSU exports are slightly higher on average
in outsider owned and worker owned firms than in SOs or MOs and
negligible in DNs.
The information on profits provided in our survey is poor, but the
questionnaire did ask firms to report whether they were typically profit
makers.  The average response to this question is reported in the second
row of Table 10.  As can be seen, according to Russian accounting
procedures most firms normally make profits, and the differences across
ownership types are negligible. Turning to capacity utilization, rates in
1994 are very low, averaging around 53 percent across all firms.
However, they are higher among DNs and lower in outsider-owned
firms.  The Russian capital stock according to the survey is relatively
modern; only around 32 percent is reported as being more than 15
years old.  Unsurprisingly, DNs have significantly younger capital on
average, but SOs, WOs and MOs are all close to the mean.  But the
proportion of old capital is rather higher in outsider owned firms: 42
percent of the total.  Finally, average wages for workers and for
managers are highest in DNs and lowest in worker owned firms.  State-
owned and managerially owned firms are around the mean, while pay
for both groups is rather above average in outsider-owned firms.  
In the remainder of this section we use regression analysis to
investigate whether these differences persist once we control for
sectoral, regional and firm-specific sources of heterogeneity within each
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ownership class. Our approach is to estimate the four versions of the
performance equations outlined at the start of this section. 
Performance in short term restructuring is analyzed in Tables 11
and 12, which explain 1994 sales and non-FSU exports respectively.
Commencing with sales, we note from column (1) of Table 11 that de
novo private firms are significantly smaller than state owned firms
(always the omitted class), as are worker owned firms.  However, in the
dynamic specification of columns (2) and (3) there are no significant
ownership effects, though the sign on all privatized firms is positive
relative to SOs.  We interpret this to imply that majority ownership
structures are not yet significantly impacting on the rate of change of
sales, though there is great persistence in turnover as well as significant
market environment effects from sectors and regions27.
From Table 12 we find that worker-owned, and even more so
outsider-owned firms, export significantly more than the other three
ownership types.  Despite considerable inertia in export performance
over time, this result persists for worker owned firms in the dynamic
specification, and remains nearly significantly when sectoral and
regional fixed effects are taken to account.  DNs export notably less; all
other ownership forms have a positive sign relative to state owned
firms.  We note from the fourth column that the size of firms is not
however a significant explanatory variable for non-FSU exports; its
inclusion leaves other results unchanged.
Turning to capacity utilization, we find contrasting ownership
effects in column(1) of Table 13.  There is no significant difference
between the rate of capacity utilization in WOs, MOs and SOs.
However, capacity utilization is significantly lower in outsider owned
firms, and higher in DNs.  The latter is easy to explain - de novo private
firms did not inherit the same excess capacity and are in fact growing
(see Richter and Schaffer (1995)).  Perhaps outsiders have taken
control only of firms with more serious restructuring problems, for
instance having faced a larger output drop or inherited worse capital.
It is interesting that these effects typically persist in the dynamic
specifications, so the change in capacity utilization is also correlated
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significantly with ownership, positively for DNs and negatively for
outsider-owned firms.  There is also weak evidence that the further
decline in capacity utilization tends to be correlated with employee
ownership.  Once again, the size of the firm does not impact on the
other results, and the size variable is not significant.
It is interesting to ask whether the differences by ownership type
are associated with the vintage of the capital stock.  There is some
evidence for this view in Table 14, at least with respect to de novo
private firms.  These are found to have a significantly lower proportion
of capital more than fifteen years old.  However, there is no
explanation of the poor showing of outsider and worker-owned forms
vis-a-vis capacity utilization here; the coefficient on OOs is insignificant
and on WOs positive and weakly significant.  Size of firm is once again
not significant.
A major issue which we predicted would distinguish insider and
outsider privatization was employment.  The regressions reported in
Table 15 however, provide little support as yet for our hypotheses.  We
do find in column (1) that de novo private firm are significantly smaller.
However the equations also reveal very strong persistence of
employment with significant sectoral effects but no ownership impact
in the dynamic specifications.  It would not be sensible to include a
size effect here, as in other equations, because we measure size of firm
by lagged employment to 1991.  Finally, we look at insider (manager
and worker) remuneration in Tables 16 and 17; one might expect these
to be higher in insider than outsider controlled or state owned firms.
In fact, there is no evidence that Russian managers or workers are
taking advantage of their position as yet to pay themselves higher
wages.  No insider ownership variables are anywhere significant.
Interestingly, however, wages of both managers and workers are found
to be higher in de novo private firms, though this is a feature caused by
inertia, sector and region rather than adjustment behavior.
Interestingly, large firms pay workers more, but not managers.
In summary, therefore, enterprise behavior indicates more
ownership effects than we found in terms of managers' self-reported
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restructuring intentions.  However these tend to concern the level of
performance rather than the pace of adjustment.  There is particularly
evidence of differences in behavior between de novo private firms and
all other ownership types.  Privatization does not yet seem to be
affecting employment or sales adjustment.
7. CONCLUSION
The most widely noted features of Russian privatization have
been its scale and remarkable speed.  In this paper, we have tried to
explore the implications of the privatization program for dominant
ownership forms, and to analyze the effects of different ownership
structures for enterprise behavior.  Our findings confirm the central
ownership role granted by the privatization process to managers and
particularly workers, though it also reveals a higher proportion of
outsider dominated firms - both privatized and formed de novo - than
expected.  What are the consequences of this ownership structure for
enterprise behavior and restructuring, and what are the policy
implication of these findings?
Theory led us to expect much better enterprise performance
across the board from outsider than state-owned firms, with insider-
controlled companies being somewhere in between.  The balance of
advantage between worker and managerial ownership depended on the
issue raised, with majority managerial ownership potentially offering
advantages in long-term and short-term restructuring, but worker
ownership perhaps superior in achieving a greater degree of
depoliticization and possibilities for evolution.
Our findings go some way towards confirming these hypotheses.
We find significant differences across various aspects of control,
behavior and restructuring between state-owned and outsider-owned
firms, most notably DNs.  There are also differences between state and
insider-owned firms, though they are less marked.  The balance of
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advantage between managerially owned and worker-owned firms is
unclear overall, but strikingly we confirm that depoliticization is more
associated with the latter than the former majority ownership form.
The results on DNs are particularly encouraging because in other work
(see eg Belka, Estrin, Schaffer and Singh (1994)), one of us has argued
that, in Poland at least, it is the small and middle sized enterprises of
the de novo private sector which is in fact leading the transition
process.  Our findings provide an initial indication that the same forces
may be at work in Russia (see also Richter and Schaffer (1995)).
But our understanding of the Russian privatization process is also
much enriched by focusing on the areas in which the data do not
support our hypotheses.  Although still preliminary, the most striking
result is that the differences between state-owned and privatized firms,
regardless of majority ownership form, are typically not very great,
especially regarding the key issue of restructuring.  This phenomenon
is probably explained by the fact that the restructuring which is
occurring at the moment arises primarily from the hardening of budget
constraints, and this impacts more or less across the board (if not
indeed more markedly on state owned firms).  Evidence from Poland
(see, eg Belka et al (1993), Estrin et al (1993)) suggest that state
owned firms will adjust their behavior in the early phase of transition
solely in response to hard budget constraints and increased market
competition, without any significant impact from changes in ownership
and control.  The force of this point is increased when we note that the
survey was undertaken relatively soon after the mass privatization was
completed, probably before major behavioral changes could be
expected as a consequence of the new ownership structures.
More subtly, the results for enterprises privatized to outsiders are
disappointing.  There is no evidence of greater depoliticization, nor of
differences in restructuring strategy, and apart from exports, virtually
no difference in performance compared with the other privatized firms,
the state owned sector.  One explanation may be that outsiders have
simply not yet been able to establish effective control over the firms in
which they have a majority stake; a view consistent with the evidence
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about managerial dominance over decision-making in the fifth section.
There is also some evidence to suggest that outsiders have taken
majority control over somewhat inferior firms, in terms of capacity
utilization, overemployment, profitability and so forth.  Perhaps
insiders, who by all accounts controlled the firm's privatization process
only accepted majority outsider ownership when the situation of the
firm was so desperate that the wider resources of outsiders were needed
to ensure survival of the organization.  In this case, the poor
performance of outsiders would be related to the larger scale of the task
in hand, rather than deficiencies of outsider control as a majority
governance group.
Finally, we must consider the consequences of worker ownership.
Our study reveals that Russian privatization has created an economy
primarily comprising majority worker-owned firms.  But the effects on
behavior and restructuring are not yet as disastrous as might have been
predicted.  Many of the reasons we have already noted:  for instance
that worker ownership may assist the process of depoliticization, but
restructuring, where it may prove a major impediment, has hardly
begun.  Some may take heart from the fact that, even in worker-owned
firms, managerial control seems assured.  However, the fact remains
that majority worker ownership may present a threat to effective
restructuring in the future, both in the long term when the key is access
to external capital markets, and in the short term when firms need to
address the problem of overstaffing.
Policy conclusions follow directly from these findings.  First, the
mass privatization program has of necessity concentrated the attention
of policymakers on the former state-owned sector, but in terms of
performance and behavior, prospects look better with de novo firms.
The government may wish to develop a more systematic strategy for
small and medium enterprise development, especially in the classic
areas of SME weakness:  access to outside (loan) capital, management
training, and dealing with bureaucracy.
The government may also wish to look more closely at what is
going on in outsider-controlled firms, to see whether the problems arise
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from deficiencies in the legal institutions and arrangements for
corporate governance.  If so, regulatory changes or more effective
enforcement of current legal requirements may be required.  
Finally, we return to the overhanging threat of majority employee
control.  We do not feel that the potential governance and behavioral
problems will necessarily be resolved by continued effective managerial
control.  In situations of conflict between workers and managers, for
example over mass redundancies, either managers will give way to the
dominant owner, or they will in some way overrule workers, which is
counter-productive insofar as it acts to undermine emerging property
rights and the rule of law.  The way forward is instead for majority
worker ownership to evolve to new ownership forms, most significantly
outsider ownership.  The key policy is therefore to ensure that
secondary markets are functioning so that worker shareholdings can be
traded, and that purchasers obtain full voting rights with their shares.
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1. Justification for these objectives and further discussion is
contained in Earle and Estrin (1995)
2. The term "depoliticization" does not precisely capture the concept
which we are investigating. According to the Webster New Collegiate
Dictionary, it means " to take out of the realm of politics". We are
concerned with inculcating a profit orientation and establishing market
discipline over firms. This relates to the nature of control over
enterprises (eg state versus private), the objectives of the controlling
group (eg rent versus profit maximizing) and  to the environment in
which they operate (eg soft versus hard budget constraints). For ease of
exposition we henceforth use the term depoliticization to refer to this
complex process of firms distancing themselves from the state.
3. Webster and Charap (1993) in an early survey of 99 private
manufacturing firms in St Petersburg find that the vast majority of
Russian entrepreneurs formerly held high level posts in state owned
enterprises. However, while their skills in the sector are clearly
relevant, it is unclear that these new entrepreneurs would also be able
to take with them favored access to government grants, let alone rent
seeking attitudes.
4. The de novo private sector as a whole, of course, can influence
industrial and economic restructuring. For example they may invest and
minimize labor costs. But they are not adjusting from a former state
owned structure to a market determined optimum, rather adjusting as
profit-maximizers to changing market conditions. As such, we exclude
them from the table.
5. Unfortunately, we are able with our data neither to compute the
shares held in a FARP nor to assess its effects on behavior.
6. Although the data do not distinguish voting from non-voting
shares, we know the method of privatization and were able to make
ENDNOTES
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adjustments for this factor in our appraisal of corporate control below.
7. According to Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993), imputing the
value of the entire Russian capital stock on the basis of the cash value
of vouchers would result in a figure around the net worth of one large
U.S. company.
8. Some evidence may be found in Pistor (1993), who states, for her
sample of recently privatized companies, that "trading volumes were
low, and usually occurred among employees and former employees" in
the summer of 1993.  Moreover, the prices on the secondary markets
were reportedly still much lower than in the original voucher auctions,
again implying extreme shyness on the part of outsiders.  Webster et al
(1994) also found little evidence of share trading.
9. A major gap in the sample concerns the date of privatization.  We
can assume that most of the privatizations in the State Program were
implemented from late 1992 until mid-1994, but lease buyouts may
have taken place earlier.
10. The structure of ownership was not available in some
observations, but often, for instance in unincorporated state enterprises,
it could be inferred and imputed.  In other cases, firms claimed to be
privatized, but reported that a majority of their shares were still held by
the state; we classified them as state-owned (SO).  Problems also arose
due to missing values, answers of an unspecified or ambiguous "other,"
and the presence of nonvoting shares.  Option 1 in the State
Privatization Program gave employees 25 percent of the shares free-of-
charge, but the shares carried no voting rights; we subtracted those
shares from the numbers given for insiders, and on this basis reclassified
a number of companies.
11. In the group of potentially privatized, we designated as SO all
companies in which the federal and regional property fund still owned
50 percent or more of the shares.
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12. Unfortunately, we had no information on which of these entities
might themselves still be state-owned, and in our analysis we are
implicitly assuming they are all private.
13. When the data did not permit us to classify companies by
dominant owner, including cases of inconsistent answers across
questions, the firms are designated "unclassified".
14. The remaining firms are unclassified.
15. The open-ended answers to the ownership (and other) questions
allowed several "other" owners to be classified reliably into one of our
categories.
16. Thus the distribution is positively skewed, implying that there
were few firms which had a small proportion of insider ownership.
Outsiders had an average of 21.5 percent of the shares, and the state
retained 13 percent on average.  Blasi also provided information on the
division of shareholdings between top managers and all other
employees:  top managers had an average of 8.6 percent of all shares
(the median was 5 percent).
17. Blasi has pointed out that he defines managers as top managers
while we refer to all managers.  Using our definition, he finds median
managerial ownership to be 15%.
18. Our 10 areas were constructed as follows: Moscow (Moscow
city), Center (Vladimirskaya, Voronezhskaya and Moskovskaya
oblasts), Urals (Permskaya, Sverdlovskaya oblasts and Bashkorstan),
West Siberia (Novosibirskaya, Tyumenskaya, Kemerovskaya oblasts
and Altayskiy kraj), East Siberia (Krasnoyarskiy and Primorskiy kraj),
Povolzhski (Tatarskaya, Saratovskaya and Samarskaya oblasts), North
Caucasus (Rostovskaya oblast and Stavropolskiy kraj), North (St.
Petersburg and Leningradskaya oblast), North (Arkhangelskaya and
Volgogradskaya oblasts), and Volga-Vyatka (Nizhnegordskaya oblast).
19. This includes owners and other actors not specifically identified
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as owners, but whom we use as proxies for the corresponding
ownership group, namely local and federal governments and banks.
20. This result remains essentially unchanged when the ownership
share variables are allowed non-linear effects as follows:  less than 10
percent was reclassified as "1", 10 to 25 percent as "2", and over 25
percent as "3".
21. A persistent problem with this data set is that, because of missing
values scattered across variables, a change in specification of the
equation can lead to major changes in the size of the data set upon
which the model is estimated. These differences are minimized by
including only lagged endogenous variables (since firms typically
report the previous value for a variable if they report it currently) and
sectoral and regional dummies (which we have for all firms). The
number of observations will typically be smaller when firm size is
included in the fourth specification.
22. In the cases where we estimated equations with such a
specification, the data set is a slightly updated version.
23. We are indebted to Mark Schaffer for suggesting this line of
enquiry.
24. The variable is defined as the sum of "Military goods" and "non-
military goods purchased by the state (hospital products, schoolbooks,
etc.)"; PRFORST4 is therefore smaller than PRFORST2.
25. The change in PRFORST2 is unavailable.
26. Because data are provided in the table only for the first half of
1994, the comparisons in this paragraph multiply the amount of
assistance for 1994 by two.  When calculating real changes, we employ
the relevant price index for the first half of 1994.
27. The fourth equation, controlling for size, is not included in Table
11 because of the close relationship between sales and employment. As
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expected, in the regression employment was found to have a positive
and significant coefficient.
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TABLE 1
Distribution of Ownership by Dominant Owner Type
DOMINANT OWNER28
OWNER SO WO MO OO DN TOTAL
STATE
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
89
21
10
14
13
15
12
13
1
5
34
40
WORKERS
  Mean 
  Standard Deviation
7
14
63
20
14
20
26
14
6
17
31
31
MANAGERS
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
2
5
12
11
63
23
7
7
58
39
17
26
OUTSIDERS
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
2
6
14
16
9
12
53
21
26
36
15
22
NUMBER OF
ENTERPRISES
110 138 40 36 45 439
SO - enterprises with dominant state stake
WO - enterprises with dominant workers stake
MO - enterprises with dominant managers stake
OO - enterprises with dominant outsiders stake
DN - new established privately owned enterprises
The TOTAL column includes firms which were not classifiable according to
dominant owner, thus this does not correspond strictly to the sum (or average)
of the previous five columns.
                                         
28 It was possible to classify some firms (2 WOs and 20 DNs) even without
complete information on ownership shares.
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TABLE 2
Legal Form by Dominant Owner Type
       LEGAL FORM
DOMINANT OWNER
TOTAL
SO WO MO OO DN
Joint Stock
Limited Liability
General Partnership
Limited Partnership
Cooperatives
Physical Persons 
State-owned Joint Stock
Leasehold
Non-incorp. state-owned
Other
27
0
1
0
0
0
8
0
68
5
120
1
0
9
1
0
0
2
0
0
30
3
1
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
31
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
12
3
1
11
2
14
0
1
0
0
267
7
4
33
2
15
11
3
70
3
TOTAL 109 133 39 31 44 415
The TOTAL column includes firms which were not classifiable according to
dominant owner, thus this does not correspond strictly to the sum of the
previous five columns.
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TABLE 3
Branch by Dominant Owner Type
INDUSTRY SECTOR
DOMINANT OWNER
TOTALSO WO MO OO DN
Energy 5 1 1 0 0 7
Fuel 8 3 1 1 0 13
Ferrous metallurgy 1 5 1 3 0 10
Nonferrous metallurgy 1 5 1 1 0 8
Chemicals 3 8 2 0 4 17
Heavy machine building 6 11 2 1 1 21
Electrotechnical 3 5 2 1 2 13
Machine tools & Computers 7 5 1 1 3 17
Automobile industry 1 5 1 2 2 11
Agricultural machinery 4 5 0 5 2 16
Light machine building 2 1 0 0 3 6
Defence industry 6 4 2 1 1 14
Ship building 2 2 1 3 0 8
Radio industry 9 3 0 0 0 12
Communications & Electronics 7 6 0 3 1 17
Metal constructions 3 5 2 4 1 15
Machine repairing 6 5 2 3 0 16
Wood harvesting 8 2 0 0 0 10
Wood working industry 3 6 3 2 3 17
Construction materials 6 7 1 1 11 26
Textiles 4 11 6 1 4 26
Clothing industry 2 13 6 1 4 26
Food processing 6 8 3 1 0 18
Meat and milk 1 9 0 1 1 12
Other industrial production 6 3 2 0 1 12
Commercial activity 0 0 0 0 1 1
Military Industrial Complex 31 12 5 4 1 53
TOTAL 110 138 40 36 45 369
TABLE 3A
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Dominant Owner by Industry Sector Group
INDUSTRY SECTOR GROUP
DOMINANT OWNER
TOTAL
SO WO MO OO DN
Fuel & Energy 13 4 2 1 0 20
Heavy Industry 36 56 13 18 18 141
Light Industry 42 34 8 13 16 113
Consumer Goods 19 44 17 4 11 95
TOTAL 110 138 40 36 45 369
Notes:
SO -  enterprises with dominant state stake
WO -  enterprises with dominant workers stake
MO -  enterprises with dominant managers stake
OO -  enterprises with dominant outsiders stake
DN -  new established privately owned enterprises
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TABLE 4
Region by Dominant Owner Type
REGION TOTAL
DOMINANT OWNER
SO WO MO OO DN
NORTH 53 17 16 6 10 4
VOLGA-VYATKA 21 6 9 1 2 3
POVOLZHSKI 49 21 18 5 1 4
NORTH CAUCASUS 36 1 23 5 3 4
URALS 49 18 14 5 6 6
WSIBERIA 43 13 21 3 4 2
ESIBERIA 29 8 6 6 3 6
MOSCOW 43 16 11 6 3 7
CENTRE 46 10 20 3 4 9
TOTAL 369 110 138 40 36 45
Notes:
SO -  enterprises with dominant state stake
WO -  enterprises with dominant workers stake
MO -  enterprises with dominant managers stake
OO -  enterprises with dominant outsiders stake
DN -  new established privately owned enterprises
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TABLE 5A
Clarification of Property Rights
Influence of Actors by Dominant Owner Type
DOMINANT OWNER
ACTOR SO WO MO OO DN TOTAL
Management, Board of Dir.
Manager shareholders
Worker shareholders
Outside indiv. owners
Outside inst. owners
Local government
Federal government
Banks
2.77
2.48
1.36
1.15
1.26
1.34
1.47
1.19
2.68
2.48
1.39
1.15
1.25
1.20
1.24
1.33
2.86
2.58
1.41
1.00
1.00
1.16
1.30
1.27
2.63
2.48
1.24
1.30
1.30
1.13
1.38
1.41
2.76
2.65
1.32
1.30
1.00
1.23
1.22
1.31
2.73
2.52
1.35
1.17
1.21
1.23
1.35
1.30
Notes:
SO -  enterprises with dominant state stake
WO -  enterprises with dominant workers stake
MO -  enterprises with dominant managers stake
OO -  enterprises with dominant outsiders stake
DN -  new established privately owned enterprises
The TOTAL column includes firms which were not classifiable according to
dominant owner, thus this does not correspond strictly to the sum (or average)
of the previous five columns.
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TABLE 5B
Decisions Concerning Employment Hiring And Firing
Of Workers, Social And Non-wage Benefits
DOMINANT OWNER
ACTOR SO WO MO OO DN TOTAL
Management, Board of Dir.
Manager shareholders
Worker shareholders
Outside indiv. owners
Outside inst. owners
Local government
Federal government
Banks
2.71
2.44
1.451
.14
1.25
1.26
1.19
1.08
2.60
2.40
1.43
1.11
1.19
1.21
1.13
1.11
2.78
2.55
1.47
1.00
1.00
1.19
1.14
1.09
2.51
2.46
1.27
1.17
1.26
1.36
1.21
1.03
2.66
2.64
1.21
1.20
1.00
1.18
1.14
1.14
2.66
2.49
1.41
1.11
1.15
1.22
1.17
1.11
The TOTAL column includes firms which were not classifiable according to
dominant owner, thus this does not correspond strictly to the sum (or average)
of the previous five columns.
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TABLE 5C
Decisions Concerning Employment Hiring And Firing
Of Management, Managerial Compensation
DOMINANT OWNER
ACTOR SO WO MO OO DN TOTAL
Management, Board of Dir.
Manager shareholders
Worker shareholders
Outside indiv. owners
Outside inst. owners
Local government
Federal government
Banks
2.69
2.40
1.24
1.11
1.21
1.30
1.26
1.10
2.61
2.32
1.33
1.12
1.23
1.19
1.16
1.11
2.86
2.52
1.36
1.00
1.06
1.13
1.14
1.10
2.74
2.57
1.26
1.17
1.41
1.25
1.10
1.03
2.66
2.74
1.28
1.10
1.00
1.10
1.14
1.14
2.69
2.47
1.31
1.11
1.19
1.22
1.19
1.11
Notes:
SO -  enterprises with dominant state stake
WO -  enterprises with dominant workers stake
MO -  enterprises with dominant managers stake
OO -  enterprises with dominant outsiders stake
DN -  new established privately owned enterprises
The TOTAL column includes firms which were not classifiable according to
dominant owner, thus this does not correspond strictly to the sum (or average)
of the previous five columns.
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TABLE 5D
Decisions Concerning Allocation Of Profits, Major Investments,
Sales Or Lease Of Major Assets, Financial Issues Generally
DOMINANT OWNER
ACTOR SO WO MO OO DN TOTAL
Management, Board of Dir.
Manager shareholders
Worker shareholders
Outside indiv. owners
Outside inst. owners
Local government
Federal government
Banks
2.77
2.47
1.42
1.19
1.46
1.34
1.46
1.24
2.87
2.53
1.68
1.23
1.34
1.27
1.25
1.27
2.92
2.81
1.63
1.10
1.12
1.23
1.28
1.13
2.67
2.41
1.26
1.43
1.63
1.33
1.32
1.23
2.63
2.71
1.26
1.22
1.00
1.29
1.27
1.22
2.81
2.59
1.53
1.25
1.37
1.29
1.32
1.23
Notes:
SO -  enterprises with dominant state stake
WO -  enterprises with dominant workers stake
MO -  enterprises with dominant managers stake
OO -  enterprises with dominant outsiders stake
DN -  new established privately owned enterprises
The TOTAL column includes firms which were not classifiable according to
dominant owner, thus this does not correspond strictly to the sum (or average) of
the previous five columns.
49
TABLE 6
Correlation of Ownership and Influence
TYPE OF OWNER n
TYPE OF DECISION
A B C D
Manager-shareholders 257 0.108 0.133 0.143 0.176*
Worker-shareholders 233 0.109 0.083 0.135 0.127
Outside individual owners 160 0.178 0.215* 0.188* 0.197*
Outside institutional owners 123 0.030 0.051 0.154 0.157
Local government 202 0.017 0.020 0.063 0.071
Federal government 188 0.150 -0.051 -0.007 0.052
Banks 193 0.209* -0.060 0.065 0.142
Notes:
  * -  1-tailed Significance: 0.01
  A -  sales, production, marketing, current operations
  B -  employment, hiring and firing of workers, social and non-wage benefits
  C -  employment, hiring and firing of management, managerial
compensation
  D -  allocation of profits, major investments, sale or lease of major assets,
financial issues generally
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TABLE 7
Depoliticization
DOMINANT OWNER
SO WO MO OO DN TOTAL
PRFORST2
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
PRFORST4
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
PROFORST
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
PRICONT
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
ARRTOST
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
STATLOAN
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
PREFLOAN
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
32.72
42.00
9.93
24.66
-5.56
17.41
.57
.52
20.00
33.67
.20
.40
22.09
35.49
22.56
35.44
2.21
12.34
-1.08
5.18
.32
.47
13.03
27.24
.14
.34
15.21
27.54
24.03
37.43
7.58
21.98
-2.89
11.31
.32
.47
13.16
24.77
.13
.33
6.40
15.79
23.82
40.95
3.10
13.93
-1.93
9.90
.30
.47
6.25
21.65
.14
.36
20.58
25.26
30.77
42.09
3.02
11.03
.20
3.26
.24
.43
6.15
22.19
.09
.29
14.00
31.94
26.27
38.61
5.50
19.18
-2.56
11.56
.38
.48
13.88
28.56
.13
.34
16.03
28.38
Definitions:
PRFORST4 = percentage of production to the state out of the total revenues in 1994;
PRFORST(T-4) = percentage of production to the state out of the total revenues in 1990;
PROFORST = change in percentage of total revenue provided by these goods in 1994 compared
to 1990.
ARRTOST = percentage of liabilities to the state which are overdue more than three months.
PRICONT=dummy which takes on value of 1 if there is rice control and 0 otherwise.
STATLOAN=dummy which takes on value 1 if enterprise received any loan from government.
PREFLOAN=percentage of total loans received at the central bank discount rate.
The TOTAL column includes firms which were not classifiable according to dominant owner,
thus this does not correspond strictly to the sum (or average) of the previous five columns.
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TABLE 7 continued
DOMINANT OWNER
SO WO MO OO DN TOTAL
GOVSUP92
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
GOVSUP93
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
GOVSUP94
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
GOVASS92
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
GOVASS93
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
GOVASS4
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
GASS94BE
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
GASS4BE
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
.33
.47
.46
.50
.39
.49
93.67
449.48
611.69
3150.09
368.50
1281.96
.16
.50
-.61
2.42
.19
.40
.32
.47
.20
.40
13.47
57.94
67.29
239.02
107.06
700.49
.10
.61
-.38
1.17
.18
.38
.28
.45
.20
.41
10.95
31.22
139.72
519.93
82.92
231.05
.06
.17
-.37
1.48
.23
.43
.37
.49
.31
.47
13.97
48.98
213.09
905.69
163.62
613.77
.11
.30
-.58
1.68
.13
.34
.16
.37
.16
.37
.18
.79
5.52
28.30
3.09
11.71
.03
.09
-.15
.68
.22
.41
.32
.47
.26
.44
30.02
225.60
220.32
1621.70
160.22
784.17
.79
13.36
.30
13.35
Definitions:
GOVSUP94-92 = dummy defined as 0 if there was no government support in 1994-92
respectively, 1 otherwise.
GOVASS94-92 = mln rubles of government assistance in years 1994-92 respectively.
GASS94BE = mln 1994 rubles of government support per employee received in 1994.
GASS4BE = GOVASS94/EMPLOYMENT91 - GOVASS93*IPI/EMPLOYMENT93, where IPI is
Industrial Price Index.
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TABLE 8.1
Depoliticization Regressions
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
DEPENDENT VARIABLES   
PRFORST4
   1     2    3
WO -7.72**
(2.46)
1.22
(1.27)
1.24
(1.43)
MO -2.34
(3.52)
1.89
(1.76)
2.48
(1.91)
OO -6.83*
(3.77)
1.02
(1.92)
 .96
(2.16)
DN -6.90**
(3.36)
2.17
(2.47)
1.99
(2.80)
PRFORST
(t-4)
NO  .66***
(.02)
.67***
(.03)
REGIONS NO NO YES
SECTORS NO NO YES
N 323 279 279
adj R2 .023 .736 .737
Notes:
*  = significant at 10% level;
** = significant at 5% level;
***= significant at 1% level.
Definitions:
PRFORST4 = percentage of production to the state out of the total revenues in 1994;
PRFORST(T-4) = percentage of production to the state out of the total revenues in 1990;
ARRTOST = percentage of liabilities to the state which are overdue more than three
months.
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TABLE 8.2
Depoliticization Regressions:  Existence of Government Support
(logits)
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GOVSUP94
     1        2         3
WO -.94***
(.29)
-.84**
(.38)
-1.21***
(.47)
MO -.94**
(.44)
-.58
(.57)
-.56
(.66)
OO -.34
(.41)
-.10
(.56)
-.47
(.66)
DN -1.25
(.46)
-.30
(.58)
.05
(.70)
GOVSUP92 NO .51
(.37)
.21
(.45)
GOVSUP93 NO 3.16***
(.39)
3.64***
(.49)
REGIONS NO NO YES
SECTORS NO NO YES
CORRECT
PREDICTIONS
(PROPORTION)
73.78 86.22 87.57
N 370 370 370
Notes: 
*  = significant at 10% level;
** = significant at 5% level;
***= significant at 1% level. 
Definitions:
GOVSUP94-92 = dummy defined as 0 if there was no government support in 1994-92
respectively, 1 otherwise.
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TABLE 8.3
Depoliticization Regressions:  Magnitude of Government Assistance
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: GOVASS94   
     1       2      3
WO -261.44**
(110.18)
-150.79*
(83.24)
-134.66
(91.16)
MO -285.58*
(158.13)
-131.82
(117.11)
-124.02
(125.15)
OO -204.88
(166.33)
-64.37
(124.29)
-81.16
(134.08)
DN -365.41**
(151.49)
-175.82
(113.52)
-176.75
(128.14)
GOVASS92 NO .79***
(.14)
.82***
(.15)
GOVASS93 NO .20***
(.02)
.19***
(.02)
REGIONS NO NO YES
SECTORS NO NO YES
No. OF PLANTS NO NO NO
EMPLOYMENT IN
1991
NO NO NO
EMPLOYMENT IN
1994
NO NO NO 
ADJUSTED R2 .013 .36 .37
N 353 343 343
Notes:
*  = if significant at less than 10% level;
** = if significant at less than 5% level;
***= significant at 1% level.
Definitions:
GOVASS94-92 = mln rubles of government assistance in years 1994-92 respectively.
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TABLE 9
Responses on Importance of Management Strategies
(Rank Order)
9.1 Responses on Importance of Production Strategy
No Production strategy SO WO MO OO DN
1 Change in area of activity 6 4 7 4 5
2 Changing production mix within 8 7 8 8 6
3 Change of inventory policy 5 6 4 7 3
4 Closing of plant/shop 3 3 3 1 2
5 Change in product quality 7 7 6 9 9
6 Disposing of assets 1 1 2 2 1
7 More efficient use of productive
resources
10 10 10 10 7
8 Changing technology 4 4 5 5 8
9 Seeking foreign consulting adv. 2 2 1 3 3
10 New investments 9 9 9 6 10
Mean 1.94 1.97 1.9 2.05 2.06
9.2 Responses on Importance of Employment Strategy
No Employment SO WO MO OO DN
1 Decrease in labor 4 5 5 4 3
2 Increase in labor 2 1 3 3 5
3 Cutting social benefits 3 3 2 2 1
4 Cutting wages 1 2 1 1 2
5 Increasing wages 7 7 7 7 7
6 Increasing wage differentials 6 6 6 6 6
7 Modifying or establishing an
internal wage scale 5 4 4 5 4
Mean 1.97 1.95 2.00 1.97 1.88
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9.3 Responses on Importance of Investment Strategy
No Investment strategy SO WO MO OO DN
1 Reducing new bank borrowing 6 5 6 5 7
2 Reschedule loans 3/4 2 3/4 2 5
3 Obtain new loans from banks 2 4 3/4 1 2
4 Obtain new loans from
non banks
1 1 1 3 3
5 Lengthening period for payables 5 6 7 7 1
6 Reducing outstanding receivables 8 8 8 8 6
7 Change bank connections 3/4 3 2 4 4
8 Seeking foreign investors 7 7 5 6 8
Mean 2.12 2.15 2.14 2.21 2.07
No Marketing strategy SO WO MO OO DN
1 Improve marketing 7 6 7 7 6
2 Change distribution network 3 5 5 6 4
3 Change suppliers 2 2 3 2 2
4 Seeking new domestic markets 6 7 6 5 7
5 Increasing export efforts 5 4 1 3 3
6 Increase product price relative to
competitors 1 1 2 1 1
7 Drop product price relative to
competitors
4 3 4 4 5
Mean 2.06 2.14 2.07 2.13 2.04
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TABLE 10
Company Performance
DOMINANT OWNER
SO WO MO OO DN TOTAL
Sales
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
Profit Maker Dummy
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
Capacity Utilization
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
% Sales to non-government
in 1994
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
% Sales Exported to
non-FSU in 1994
  Mean
  Standard Deviation
  
157022
53763
.86
.34
54
26
90
25
3
6
5970
41956
.86
.35
50
26
98
12
5
15
3785
8913
.90
.30
56
24
92
22
2
 7
3071
5354
.89
.32
43
29
97
14
8
20
 682
3086
.87
.34
43
29
97
11
9
20
7382
36949
.87
.34
53
27
95
19
0
0
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TABLE 10 continued
Company Performance
DOMINANT OWNER
SO WO MO OO DN TOTAL
Percent of Capital
Stock aged > 15yrs
  Mean
  Standard Dev.
Employment in 94
  Mean
  Standard Dev.
Wage of workers
  Mean
  Standard Dev.
Wage of managers
  Mean
  Standard Dev.
36
29
3016
7959
135988
111337
162957
175990
29
28
1886
8196
127062
98102
159976
132727
30
31
1293
1808
131510
102536
174029
162253
42
316
2072
3639
144357
118705
205718
174979
9
23
98
146
173633
141316
226103
196806
32
31
1904
6269
1355451
08353
1734741
59915
Notes:
SO  -  enterprises with dominant state stake
WO -  enterprises with dominant workers stake
MO -  enterprises with dominant managers stake
OO -  enterprises with dominant outsiders stake
DN -  new established privately owned enterprises
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TABLE 11
Sales in 1994
1 2 3
WO -9775*
(5581)
2912
(2021)
3277
(2206)
MO -11916
(8063)
3035
(3037)
2136
(3230)
OO -12631
(8357)
2437
(3188)
1642
(3481)
DN -15020***
(7524)
2605
(3002)
2691
(3385)
Lagged
endogenous
variable (1 year)
No 2.76***
(0.08)
2.76***
(0.08)
Sectors No No Yes**
Regions No No Yes**
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.86 0.86
N 2.98 246 246
Notes:
SO -  enterprises with dominant state stake
WO -  enterprises with dominant workers stake
MO -  enterprises with dominant managers stake
OO -  enterprises with dominant outsiders stake
DN -  new established privately owned enterprises
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TABLE 12
Percentage Sales Exported to Non-FSU
1 2 3 4
WO 2.24*
(1.64)
-2.71**
(1.47)
2.58
(1.67)
.10
(2.19)
MO .07
(2.28)
1.27
(2.06)
.58
(2.27)
-3
(3.39)
OO 6.16***
(2.52)
3.48
(2.29)
4.09
(2.45)
2.77
(3.23)
DN -2.55
(2.17)
.29
(1.98)
-.003
(2.34)
-4.08
(4.47)
Sectors No No Yes Yes
Regions No No Yes Yes
Size/1000 No No No .14
(.12)
Lagged
endogenous
variable
No 8.89***
(1.01)
8.29***
(1.12)
.77***
(.14)
Adjusted R2 .02 .21 .17 .12
N 325 325 325 243
Notes
* denotes significance at 10%level
*** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 1% level
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TABLE 13
Capacity Utilization in 1994
1 2 3 4
WO -3.50
(3.78)
-3.97*
(2.43)
-3.17
(2.73)
-4.74*
(2.81)
MO 1.77
(5.37)
-5.46
(3.47)
-5.68
(3.76)
-7.33*
(3.74)
OO -10.63*
(5.87)
-3.38
(3.80)
-7.42*
(4.20)
-7.68*
(4.02)
DN 16.00***
(5.02)
5.87**
(3.23)
8.70**
(3.76)
7.03
(5.39)
Size/1000 No No No -.14
(.17)
Lagged
endogenous
variable
No 0.87***
(0.04)
0.85***
(0.05)
.88***
(.05)
Sectors No No Yes Yes
Regions No No Yes** Yes
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.62 0.62 .68
N 294 285 246 235
Notes
* denotes significance at 10%level
*** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 1% level
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TABLE 14
Proportion of Capital Stock More than 15 Years Old
1 2 3
WO -6.84*
(3.96)
-5.96
(5.19)
-5.82
(5.92)
MO 6.17
(5.78)
3.42
(7.41)
5.01
(8.25)
OO 6.57
(5.84)
8.74
(7.6)
10.04
(8.32)
DN -27.0***
(5.3)
-23.6***
(7.0)
1.24
(12.85)
Average of
sector 
No -0.02
(0.14)
.02
(.19)
Size/1000 No No .17
(.36)
Sector No Yes*** Yes
Region No Yes*** Yes
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.08 .02
N 308 244 193
Notes
* denotes significance at 10%level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 1% level
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TABLE 15
Full Time Employment
1 2 3
WO -1130
(895)
-183
(277)
-161
(279)
MO 1723
(1269)
930
(391)
-176
(382)
OO 944
(1352)
-428
(415)
-327
(414)
DN -2918**
(1206)
153
(405)
200
(418)
Lagged
endogenous
variable
No 0.92***
(0.02)
-0.91***
(0.02)
Sector No No Yes***
Region No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.91 0.93
N 337 317 317
Notes
* denotes significance at 10%level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 1% level
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TABLE 16
Average Monthly Wage of Managers
1 2 3 4
WO -2981
(22733)
-20219
(19217)
-4737
(20887)
-10530
(23967)
MO 11071
(33007)
-19910
(28176)
-6645
(29000)
-19562
(32013)
OO 42760
(34183)
-10793
(29363)
19446
(31141)
7112
(34160)
DN 63146***
(31995)
23213
(27675)
30414
(31174)
61325
(60562)
Size No No No -2.37
(1.48)
Lagged endogenous
variable (1 year)
No 0.94***
(0.16)
1.63***
(0.18)
1.60***
(.21)
Sector No No Yes*** Yes
Regions No No Yes*** Yes
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.31 0.35 .36
N 306 306 306 245
Notes
* denotes significance at 10%level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 1% level
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TABLE 17
Average Monthly Wage of Workers
1 2 3 4
WO -7418
(15319)
-14204
(14548)
-4352
(14872)
-8884
(14626)
MO -2969
(22690)
-9136
(21408)
-11830
(20866)
-12636
(19778)
OO 98780
(23242)
3492
(22205)
7872
(22343)
8496
(21043)
DN 39153**
(21741)
29694
(68208)
26662
(22155)
29514
(37275)
Size No No No 1.59*
(0.92)
Lagged endogenous
variable (1 year)
No 0.792***
(0.12)
0.58
(0.12)
1.64***
(0.18)
Sectors No No Yes* Yes
Regions No No Yes* Yes
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.13 0.27 0.43
N 310 310 310 248
Notes:
* denotes significance at 10%level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 1% level
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FIGURE 1
Comparison of the Impact of Alternative Ownership
Forms in Attaining Objectives of Transition
WO MO OO DN
Reorientation ++ + +++ +++
Long-Term
Restructuring
  unbundling
  investment 
  internal
organization
+
+
++
++
+++
+++
+++
U
U
U
Short-Term
Restructuring
  non-labor cost
minimization
  labor cost
minimization
++
0
++
+
++
++
U
U
Evolution ++ + +++ +++
All entries are relative to the status quo; state ownership
Notes:
+ denotes better
++ denotes much better
+++ denotes comparable to Western firms
U denotes not a relevant comparison
O denotes the same as the status quo
67
REFERENCES 
Aghion, P., and W. Carlin, The Economics of Enterprise Restructuring
in Central and Eastern Europe, World Bank mimeo, 1994.
Aghion, P., O. Blanchard and R. Burgess, "Restructuring Enterprises
in Eastern Europe", European Economic Review, 1994.
Belka, M., Estrin, S.,Schaffer, M and Singh, I.J., "Enterprise
Adjustment in Poland: Evidence from a Survey of 200 Privatized,
Private and State Owned Firms", LSE Centre For Economic
Performance Working Paper 658, 1994
Blanchard, O., S. Commander, and F. Coricelli, Unemployment and
Restructuring in Eastern Europe, World Bank mimeo, 1994.
Blanchard, O., R. Dornbusch, P. Krugman, R. Layard, and L.
Summers, Reforms in Eastern Europe, Cambridge, Massachusetts
and London, England: MIT 1991.
Blasi, J., and Shleifer, A. "Corporate Governance in Russia:
An Initial Look", mimeo 1995.
Blasi, J., "Ownership, Governance, and Restructuring," in I. Lieberman
and J. Nellis, Russia:  Creating Private Enterprises and Efficient
Markets, The World Bank, 1994.
Boycko, M., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, "Privatizing Russia,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1993.
Commander, S., Dhar, S. and Yemtsov, R. "How Russian Firms Make
Their Wage and Employment Decisions", World Bank mimeo,
1995.
68
Earle, J.S. and S. Estrin, "Employee Ownership in Transition," paper
presented to the World Bank-Central European University
Conference on Corporate Governance in Central Europe and
Russia, December 1994 (revised February 1995).
Earle, J.S., R. Frydman, and A. Rapaczynski, "Notes on Voucher
Privatization in Eastern Europe," in D. Fair and R. Raymond,
editors, The New Europe:  Evolving Economic and Financial
Systems in East and West, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993a.
Earle, J.S., R. Frydman, and A. Rapaczynski, "Privatization Policies in
Eastern Europe:  Diverse Routes to a Market Economy" in
Privatization in the Transition to a Market Economy:  Studies of
Policies and Preconditions in Eastern Europe, London: Pinter
Publishers and St. Martin's Press, 1993b.
Estrin, S., (editor), Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe,
London: Longman, 1994.
Estrin, S., A. Gelb, and I. J. Singh, "Restructuring, Viability and
Privatization: a Comparative Study on Enterprise Adjustment in
Transition," World Bank mimeo, 1993. 
Frydman, R., A. Rapaczynski, and J.S. Earle, et al, The Privatization
Process in Central Europe, CEU Press, 1993a.
Frydman, R., A. Rapaczynski, and J.S. Earle, et al, The Privatization
Process in Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic Republics, CEU Press,
1993b.
Hansmann, H., "When Does Worker Ownership Work?" Yale Law
Review,99, no 8, June 1990, 1751-816.
69
Ickes, B. and R. Ryterman, paper delivered to a Conference on
Privatization and Restructuring in Russia at IIASA, July 1993.
Kornai, J., The Socialist System:  The Political Economy of
Communism, Princeton University Press, 1992.
McFaul, M., "Agency Problems in the Privatization of Large
Enterprises in Russia," in M. McFaul and T. Perlmutter (editors),
Privatization, Conversion and Enterprise Reform in Russia,
Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford
University, 1994.
OECD, Trends and Policies in Privatization, Vol. 1, No. 3, Special
Feature on Management and Employee Buyouts in the Context
of Privatization, Paris, 1994.
Pinto, B., M. Belka, and S. Krajewski, "Transforming State Enterprises
in Poland:  Evidence on Adjustment by Manufacturing Firms,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1: 1993, pp. 213-270.
Pistor, K., "Privatization and Corporate Governance in Russia:  An
Empirical Study," in M. McFaul and T. Perlmutter (editors),
Privatization, Conversion and Enterprise Reform in Russia,
Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford
University, 1994.
Radygin, A. D., "Privatization and Investment in Russia:  Why the
Model Needs Revision," in Studies on Russian Economic
Development, Vol. 5, No. 5, 1994.
Richter, A. and Schaffer, M., "Growth, Investment and Newly-
Established Firms in Russian Manufacturing", LSE mimeo, 1995.
70
Shleifer, A. and Vasilyev, V., "Managerial Ownership and the Russian
Privatization," paper presented to the World Bank-Central
European University Conference on Corporate Governance in
Central Europe and Russia, December 1994, revised 1995.
Webster, L, Franz, J., Artimov, I and Wackman, H., "Newly-Privatized
Russian Enterprises:  A Survey," World Bank Technical paper
no.241, Oct 1994.
